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Abstract
In the research group we are working to provide further em-
pirical evidence on the business failure forecast. Complex fit-
ting modelling; the study of variables such as the audit impact 
on business failure; the treatment of traditional variables and 
ratios have led us to determine a starting point based on a ref-
erence mathematical model. In this regard, we have restricted 
the field of study to non-financial galician SMEs in order to 
develop a model1 to diagnose and forecast business failure. We 
have developed models based on relevant financial variables 
from the perspective of the financial logic, voltage and finan-
cial failure, applying three methods of analysis: discriminant, 
logit and multivariate linear. Finally, we have closed the first 
cycle using mathematical programming –DEA or Data Envel-
opment Analysis– to support the failure forecast. The simulta-
neous use of models was intended to compare their respective 
conclusions and to look for inter-relations. We can say that the 
resulting models are satisfactory on the basis of their capacity 
for prediction. Nevertheless, DEA contains significant points 
of criticism regarding its applicability to business failure.
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DEA como herramienta en el pronóstico del fallo empresarial. Aplicación al 
caso de las Pyme gallegas
Resumen
Este grupo de investigación busca aportar mayor evidencia del pronóstico del fracaso em-
presarial. La construcción de modelos de ajuste complejos, el estudio de variables tales 
como el impacto de la auditoría en el pronóstico del fracaso, así como el tratamiento de 
variables y ratios clásicas nos lleva a determinar un punto de partida mediante la construc-
ción de un modelo matemático que sirva de referencia. En este sentido, hemos reducido el 
ámbito de estudio a Pyme no financieras gallegas con el fin de desarrollar un modelo que 
permita diagnosticar y pronosticar el fracaso empresarial. Hemos desarrollado los modelos 
con base en variables financieras relevantes desde la óptica de la lógica financiera, la ten-
sión y el fracaso financiero, aplicando tres metodologías de análisis: discriminante, logit y 
lineal multivariante. Por último, hemos cerrado el primer ciclo, utilizando la programación 
matemática DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) con el fin de fundamentar la determinación 
del fracaso.  El uso simultáneo de los modelos se explica por la voluntad de comparar 
sus respectivas conclusiones y buscar elementos de complementariedad. La capacidad de 
pronóstico lograda nos permite afirmar que los modelos obtenidos son satisfactorios. No 
obstante, el DEA presenta determinados puntos críticos significativos en cuanto a su apli-
cabilidad al pronóstico del fallo empresarial.
Palabra clave: investigación operativa DEA, fracaso empresarial, pronóstico.
Introduction
Business failure in its different manifestations –bankruptcy, temporary insolven-
cies, bankruptcy proceedings, mergers and spin-offs– is a recurrent topic in  fi-
nancial literature for its theoretical importance and for its serious consequences 
for  economic activity. We are currently seeing an inexplicable fluctuation and 
lack of control in the national risk premium, which seems to be explained by the 
so-called insolvency of the analysed country. This prospect is sometimes promo-
ted by particular elements in the market that often have a speculative nature and 
others by the incorrect rating of the “rating agencies,” which are suspected to be 
biased and even completely incompetent, as well as in total cohabitation with the 
economic centres of decision. The mathematical models developed to this day are 
able to show the difference between failed and non-failed companies. The capacity 
to forecast  business failure is important from the point of view of shareholders, DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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creditors, employees, etc. Direct costs associated with business failure in the ju-
dicial environment represent an average 5% of the company’s book value. Also, 
indirect costs connected with loss of sales and profits, the growth of credit cost 
(risk premium), the impossibility to issue new shares and the loss of investment 
opportunities increase that cost to nearly 30%.2 Therefore, it is important to detect 
the possibility of insolvency in its first stages.
The first contributions date back to Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980), who examined different methodological alternatives to the development of 
explanatory and forecast models for these events. The most traditional approach 
has been enriched with the development of alternative models, more reliable and 
less dependent on methodological, determining factors; among them, we can hi-
ghlight the logit and the probit analyses; the recursive portioning techniques and 
several characteristic forms of artificial intelligence –both expert systems and ne-
tworks of artificial brain cells, as well as support vector machines. The complex 
and unstructured nature of the analysis also justifies the application of heuristic 
methods such as computer-assisted techniques of social decision and, of course, 
fuzzy logic models.
Business failure
The research of business failure in its different manifestations –bankruptcy, tem-
porary insolvencies, bankruptcy proceedings, mergers and spin-offs– is a recurrent 
topic in  financial literature for its theoretical importance and for its serious con-
sequences for the economic activity. Several alternative methodologies have been 
discussed on the basis of the first contributions of Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) 
and Ohlson (1980) in order to develop explanatory and predictive models for these 
events. The most traditional approach, materialised in the initial studies by Altman 
(Altman, 1968; Altman et al., 1977; Altman, 2000; Altman et al., 2010), has been 
enriched with the development of alternative models, perhaps more reliable and 
less dependent on methodological, determining factors; among them, we can high-
light the logit and the probit analyses (Martin, 1977; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 
1984); the recursive portioning techniques (Frydman et al., 1985) and several char-
acteristic forms of artificial intelligence –both expert systems and networks of arti-
ficial brain cells (Messier and Hansen, 1988; Bell et al., 1990; Hansen and Messier, 
2Warner (1977)Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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1991; Serrano and Martín del Brio, 1993; Koh and Tan, 1999; Brockett et al.,  2006), 
as well as support vector machines (Shin et al., 2005; Härdle et al., 2005). The 
complex and unstructured nature of the analysis also justifies the application of 
heuristic methods such as computer-assisted techniques of social decision (level-3 
GDSS, for example Sun and Li, 2009) and, of course, fuzzy logic models (Dubois 
and Prade, 1992; Slowinski and Zopounidis, 1995; McKee and Lensberg, 2002). 
The first formal study of the business failure based on explanatory models was 
performed by Beaver (1966), who analysed the phenomenon with the help of the 
financial logic and the information provided by the financial statements. Beaver’s 
approach (1966) provides an expanded vision of the business failure concept per-
fectly consistent with the modern financial approach, although suffering from the 
inherent limitations of his statistical methodology. 
Altman (1968) is the reference antecedent in the application of the multivariate 
approach to the business failure issue: he suggested the development of discrimi-
nant models that, apart from the proper classification, could become de facto stan-
dards and contribute to enhancing the objectivity of the solvency analysis. Howe-
ver, the implementation of MDA is conditioned by its scenario, particularly, by the 
requirement that factors should be distributed in accordance with a normal model 
–something that, as is known, is at least arguable in the case of financial ratios– and 
by the fact that the (failed and solvent) subpopulations should be homoscedastic. 
Due to its mathematical approach, the discriminant models do not provide specific 
information to determine the causes and internal structure of the failed event, even 
when they [are] re-estimated for several time windows (De Llano et al., 2010, 
2011abc).
Ohlson  (1980)  used  the  logit  approach,  which  was  originally  used  by  Martin 
(1977), to assess the solvency of financial entities, and generalised it for a more ge-
neral case: the non-financial companies. He improves Martin’s original approach 
(1977) thanks to a theory that estimates the probability of failure in an industrial 
company on the basis of four basic attributes: dimension, financial structure, finan-
cial performance and liquidity. Beyond the methods, the logit approach is in line 
with the idea that business failure is not a dichotomous event, as Altman’s MDA 
approach showed, but a complex gradable phenomenon. That is precisely why a 
comprehensive classification may be less relevant and significant than the measu-
rement of the likelihood that a company will fail, irrespective of the specification DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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chosen for this dependent variable. Altogether, logit models have proved to be at 
least as efficient as MDA. Finally Ohlson (1980) confirmed that combining purely 
accounting information with external and market indicators allows for a signifi-
cant improvement of the explanatory and predictive capacity of models, as well 
as providing the first indications that financially distressed companies tend to get 
involved in formal irregularities (such as delays in annual account deposits or the 
accumulation of qualifications) and minimise the flow of information even beyond 
the legally required standards (Piñeiro et al., 2011).
The development and validation of these models have provided valuable evidence, 
not only to better understand the causes and evolution of the financial and structural 
processes that lead to failure but also to identify key variables and indicators that 
directors and external users should control in order to infer the existence of finan-
cial dysfunctions and forecast possible default or insolvency events. Here we must 
highlight a small number of financial ratios related to liquidity, profitability and the 
circulation of current assets and liabilities (Rodríguez et al., 2010), and also macro-
economic factors (Rose et al., 1982), proxies related to management quality (Peel et 
al., 1986; Keasey and Watson, 1987), and qualitative indicators related to the audit 
of accounts (Piñeiro et al., 2011).
It is precisely because of the failure events that the design and contrast of em-
pirical models tend to emphasise their capacity to identify financially distressed 
companies. Therefore, the validation seems to have been aimed at enhancing the 
capacity to prevent type II errors (to wrongly assume that a faltering and potentia-
lly failed company is financially healthy). A still unsolved question refers to the 
precise study of false positives, i.e. the study of solvent companies classified as 
potentially failed. Ohlson (1980) draws attention to the abnormally low error rates 
observed in earlier studies (especially in Altman’s MDA models), as later research 
has shown divergences that are not explained in the type I and type II (de Llano et 
al., 2010). Due to reasons that may be rooted in the sampling or the method itself, 
models seem to achieve outstanding results among failed companies unlike the 
solvent companies, suggesting that they tend to overestimate the probability of 
failure: the rate of healthy companies qualified as potentially failed is significantly 
high, at least when compared to the type I error rate. Our experience shows that 
these biased opinions are concentrated in companies that share specific financial 
characteristics because of, for example, the nature of their activity, financial and 
ownership structure, or the temporal asymmetries in their income generation pace. Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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This issue is closely connected to the initial calibration of the model as well as 
the later analysis of its coefficients (Moyer, 1977; Altman, 2000). But besides its 
statistical relevance, a type I error has an enormous practical significance for the 
company, as it undermines lenders’ and market confidence, and it may also under-
mine the company’s financial standing, driving it to an eventual insolvency, which 
otherwise would not have happened.
In recent years a number of models based on the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) have been developed to forecast business failures and compare these re-
sults with those achieved through other techniques such as the Z-Score (Altman) 
or the LOGIT (Olshon). The logistic regression technique uses the cut-off point 
of 0.5 for the classification (potential failure probability, cut-off point to rate the 
cases). In terms of probability, this means that the companies who are over the 
cut-off point are solvent and the ones who are not are insolvent. As Premachandra3 
pointed out, the LOGIT cut-off point of 0.5 is not appropriate for the classification 
of both failed and non-failed companies when using the DEA efficiency analysis. 
He said that efficiency scores in DEA analyses can be too slant, especially when 
using super-efficient DEA models. Therefore, if we use the DEA analysis as a tool 
to forecast business failure, we should use an adjusted discriminant analysis or an 
evaluating function, establishing values between 0.1 and 0.9 for the cut-off point. 
There are many studies in the literature where the logistic regression –or probit– is 
used to forecast business failures. They are methods based on separating the fit 
sample from the contrast sample. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA),4 5  called frontier analysis, is one of the li-
near programming applications. This is a mathematical programming technique 
to measure the performance of groups of economic or social structures within the 
same industry sector. DEA purpose is to measure the efficiency of each organi-
sational unit by translating the available data into multiple results explaining its 
efficiency: the degree of input-efficiency. Due to the high number of relevant va-
riables, it is difficult for the manager to determine which components of the orga-
nisation are actually efficient. Efficiency will be determined by the ratio between 
3Premachandra et al.  (2009).
4Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978).
5De Llano and Piñeiro (2011): 221-225.DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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the monetary value of the output (ur) and the monetary value of the input (vi):
 Defined in this manner, efficiency expresses the 
conversion ratio of inputs to outputs. The closer the coefficient is to 1, the higher 
the degree of efficiency will be for the organisation assessed. One limitation of this 
efficiency measurement system is that prices must be identical, otherwise the com-
parison cannot be considered to be fair. The efficiency values for each analysed 
element must be between 0 and 1. The construction of the mathematical program-
ming model requires to define the objective function, which will be the result of 
maximising the total value of the final products:6   The model 
only generates one restriction, where outputs are equal to the inputs for all the 
companies analysed   . It appears that we are being taken away 
from the financial target of having an efficient company if the value of its Outputs 
(ur) is higher than the value of its Inputs (vi). What we are trying to determine is the 
value that makes the company (E=1) efficient. Consequently, the company that is 
not efficient will have a lower value (E<1). Notwithstanding the trivial interpreta-
tion of “how can it be possible that the output is lower than the input?” it is clear 
that   
 
does not work for us as it means that   , which in PL terms is the 
same as saying that   . The solution algorithm aims to wear out the limits 
of restrictions, therefore, to cancel h. In this case, the associated shadow price will 
(most likely) be positive. We also know that this means that if it was possible to in-
crease the corresponding input available by one unit we would be able to increase 
the output volume by one unit too. Thus:
•  It makes sense to demand   because it is coherent with the logic of the 
PL model regarding minimising the surpluses, which in this case means 
an  inactive  production  capacity  associated  to  good  financial  standings. 
This idea implied in the investment models: performed projects equal to 
resources  available  and,  the  good  financial  standing  reflecting  inactive 
funding –which we will try to minimise.
•  The  ideal  maximum  would  be  achieved  when  all  the  good  financial 
standings were cancelled, which would mean to maximise the use of the 
6Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978).Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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resources. This production unit, i.e. this company, would be the efficiency 
paradigm and would be standing in that imaginary frontier resulting from 
the model.
•  In terms of duality, this ideal maximum allows us to evaluate the mixture and 
the degree of use of the resources, assigning them a price. It is interesting to 
observe that, the way they are now, these optimal conditions are a similar 
concept to the theoretical relation of balance between the revenues and the 
marginal costs –the marginal cost is that one caused by the increase of the 
limit of restriction while the marginal income is the increase of the output, 
precisely, the shadow price. Again, the maximum refers to I’ = C’, i.e. to 
output = input.
In 1993 Barr, Seiford and Siems released a tool to measure the managerial efficien-
cy of banks based on financial and accounting information. The model used banks’ 
essential functions of financial intermediation to determine a tool to measure their 
productivity. The traditional way to measure productivity is the ratio of the multi-
ple outputs and inputs.
We use the term DMUs for Decision Making Units. Perhaps we should try to turn 
it into a worldlier term and talk about the elements we wish to compare: Depart-
ments; Companies; Transportation; Communications; etcetera, or any other ele-
ment/unit we wish to compare to another or others of its peers. Thus, if we consider 
that we have m inputs and s outputs, the DMU will explain the given transfor-
mation of the input m in the output s as a measure of productivity (efficiency). 
The literature about investments has been focused on the study of models with 
measurable variables. That’s why in the last decades we found a few new models 
covering the need for including all those variables that take part in the decision 
making process regarding investments but that are not  being considered because 
of their intangible nature.
Troutt (1996) introduced a technical note based upon three assumptions: mono-
tonicity of all variables, convexity of the acceptable set and no Type II errors (no 
false negatives). They use an efficient frontier that is commonly used in various fi-
nancial fields. Essentially, DEA can be used just to accept or reject systems as long 
as all the variables are conditionally monotone and the acceptable set is convex.
Retzlaff-Roberts (1996) stresses two seemingly unrelated techniques: DEA and 
DA (Discriminant Analysis). She points out that DEA is a model to evaluate rela-DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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tive efficiencies, whenever the relevant variables are measurable. On the contrary, 
the discriminant analysis is a forecast model such as in the business failure case. 
Both methods (DEA – DA) aim at making classifications (in our case, of failed and 
healthy companies) by specifying the set of factors or weights that determines a 
particular group membership relative to a “threshold” (frontier).
Sinuany-Stern (1998) provides an efficiency and inefficiency model based on the 
optimisation of the common weights through DEA, on the same scale. This me-
thod, Discriminant DEA of Ratios, allows us to rank all the units on a particular 
unified scale. She will later review the DEA methodology along with Adler (2002), 
introducing a set of subgroups of models provided by several researchers, and ai-
med at testing the ranking capacity of the DEA model in the determination of effi-
ciency and inefficiency on the basis of the DMUs. In the same way, Cook (2009) 
summarises 30 years of DEA history. In particular, they focus on the models me-
asuring efficiency, the approaches to incorporate multiplier restrictions, certain 
considerations with respect to the state of variables and data variation modelling.
Moreover, Chen (2003) models an alternative to eliminate non-zero slacks while 
preserving the original efficient frontier. 
There have been many contributions in recent years, of which we can highlight 
Sueyoshi (2009), who used the DEA-DA model to compare Japanese machinery 
and electric industries, R&D expenditure and its impact in the financial structure 
of both industries. Premachandra (2009) compares DEA, as a business failure pre-
diction tool, to logistic regression. Liu (2009), with regards to the existing search 
for the “good” efficient frontier, tries to determine the most unfavourable scenario, 
i.e. the worst efficient frontier with respect to failed companies, where ranking the 
worst performers in terms of efficiency is the worst case of the scenario analy-
sed. Sueyoshi and Goto (2009a) compare the DEA and DEA-DA methods from 
the perspective of the financial failure forecast. Sueyoshi and Goto (2009b) use 
DEA-DA to determine the classification error of failed companies in the Japanese 
construction industry. Sueyoshi (2011) analyses the capacity of the classification 
by combining DEA and DEA-DA, as in (2011a) on the Japanese electric industry. 
Finally, Chen (2012) extends the application of DEA to two-stage network structu-
res, as Shetty (2012) proposes a modified DEA model to forecast business failure 
in Information Technology and IT Enabled Services companies (IT/ITES) in India.Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Thirty years of DEA
It has been thirty years since Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes released their model to 
measure efficiency in 1978, a model that is used to compare efficiency between 
several units, departments, companies and tools. It is a technique that allows us to 
determine relative efficiency and that requires to have quantitative capacity: inputs 
at their price, outputs at their price. 
In 2009, Cook and Seinford released an article containing the evolution of DEA 
from 1978 to 2008, as just a DEA evolution overview and its state of the art. Re-
garding business failure, the really important thing is the union of DEA with the 
DA phenomenology; DEA adversus DEA-DA. Before discussing the modelling 
and results, we should note that DEA is just used to determine relative efficiency. 
Therefore, it is not an instrument that can be used to classify “in or out of,” yes/no, 
“before or after;” as DEA measures relative efficiency, not maximum or optimal 
efficiency despite its  being based on linear programming optimisation.
Proposal
In order to contrast the model, we have taken a sample of small and medium size 
galician enterprises, which have been put into two categories: failed and healthy. 
Despite not showing in detail the very different causes why the companies got into 
financial troubles, the sample has the strength of being objective and guaranteeing 
a comprehensive classification for all the companies, which is essential for the 
application of the several analysis methods (MDA, Logit, and DEA). The use of 
more flexible criteria is undoubtedly an option to consider to refine the system 
since it shows more accurately specific situations of insolvency such as the return 
of stocks. Nevertheless, the special features of these situations bring forward an 
element of subjectivity, as there are several sources of information (RAI, BADEX-
CUG, etc.), not all of them compatible.
We have had access to the official accounting information of 75 640 galician com-
panies between 2000 and 2010. Out of them, three hundred and eighty-four (384) 
are in a situation of bankruptcy or final liquidation, thereby, there are 298 left with 
valid data. We will focus on these companies –which we will call failed from now 
on– when modelling the failure process and deducing forecast criteria based on 
the accounting information and/or the information provided by the audit report. DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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Likewise, we have managed to get 107 healthy companies – galician SMEs that 
in the last years have “always” had an audit report rated as “pass,” and that have 
been used to determine the models LOGIT, MDA and the efficiency contrast DEA. 
Selection of the explanatory variables
The particular problem raised by the election of the forecast variables is a signi-
ficant issue because of the lack of a well-established business failure theory. The 
consequential use of experimental subgroups means that results cannot be compa-
red either transversely or temporarily. The choice of the explanatory variables has 
been based on two principles: popularity in the accounting and financial literature, 
and frequency and significance level in the most relevant studies on business fai-
lure forecast. In all cases, ratios have been calculated on the basis of the indicators 
recorded in the Annual Accounts without introducing adjustments previously ob-
served in the literature, such as marking-to-market or the use of alternative accoun-
ting methods.
Table 1 
Financial ratios
 
Reference R a t i o Financial measure
ACT01 Financial expenses / added value Activity
ACT02 Payroll expenses / fixed asset Activity
ACT03 Payroll expenses + amortisation / add val Activity
ACT04 Operating income / Operating costs Activity
ACT05 Added value / sales Activity
LEV01 B.a.i.t. / Financial expenses Leverage
LEV02 Financial expenses / Total debt Leverage
LEV03 Operating result / Financial expenses Leverage
LEV04 Net result / total liabilities Leverage
IND01 Total debt / Own funds Indebtedness
IND02 Own funds – Net result / short-term liabilities Indebtedness
IND03 Own funds / Consolidated liabilities Indebtedness
IND04 Long-term liabilities / Consolidated liabilities Indebtedness
STR01 Current assets / total assets Structure
STR02 Dot. Amortisation / net fixed assets Structure
STR03 Circulating capital / total assets Structure
STR04 Circulating capital / Consolidated liabilities Structure
STR05 Circulating capital / sales Structure
STR06 Cash in hand / total assets StructurePablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Reference R a t i o Financial measure
STR07 Net result / Circulating capital Structure
STR08 Asset decomposition measure Structure
LIQ01 Operating cash flow / total assets Liquidity
LIQ02 Operating cash flow / Consolidated liabilities Liquidity
LIQ03 Operating cash flow / short-term liabilities Liquidity
LIQ04 Operating cash flow / sales Liquidity
LIQ05 Operating cash flow / total assets Liquidity
LIQ06 Operating cash flow / total liabilities Liquidity
LIQ07 Operating cash flow / short-term liabilities Liquidity
LIQ08 Cash flow, resources generated / sales Liquidity
LIQ09 Cash in hand / current liabilities Liquidity
LIQ10 Stock / short-term liabilities Liquidity
LIQ11 Stock + realizable / short-term liabilities Liquidity
LIQ12 No credit interval Liquidity
LIQ13 Realizable / short-term liabilities Liquidity
PRO01 B.a.i.t. / total assets Profitability
PRO02 B.a.i.t. / sales Profitability
PRO03 Net result / sales Profitability
PRO04 Net Result-realisable– Stock / total assets Profitability
PRO05 Net result / total assets Profitability
PRO06 Net result / Own funds Profitability
ROT01 Current assets – Stock / sales Rotation
ROT02 Stock / sales Rotation
ROT03 Sales / Receivables Rotation
ROT04 Sales / Current assets Rotation
ROT05 Sales / fixed asset Rotation
ROT06 Sales / total assets Rotation
ROT07 Sales / Circulating capital Rotation
ROT08 Sales / Cash in hand Rotation
SOL01 Current assets–Stock / short-term liabilities Solvency
SOL02 Current assets / Total debt Solvency
SOL03 Current assets / current liabilities Solvency
SOL04 Fixed asset / Own funds Solvency
SOL05 Consolidated liabilities / total assets Solvency
SOL06 Own funds / total assets Solvency
SOL07 Own funds / fixed assets Solvency
SOL08 Short-term liabilities / total assets Solvency
SOL09 Profit before tax / short-term liabilities Solvency
TES01 Cash flow / current liabilities Treasury
TES02 Treasury / sales TreasuryDEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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Significant variables: LEV04, ROT06, SOL06, LIQ12, PRO05, LIQ05, IND03, STR03. 
On the basis of the preceding considerations, the related MDA, MRL models7 were 
determined with the following results:8
Table 2 
MDA prediction (BD2a may 2010)
Table 3
LOGIT prediction (BD2a may 2010)
7De Llano et al. (2010, 2011a, b, c).
8YB, yb: Year Before the failure: 1YB one year before the failure, 2YB two years before, 3 YB three years before, 
4YB four years before, GLOBAL four years altogether.
Forecasts for 
failed s/(H, F)
1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb
MDA 1 YB 
Forecast
96.3% 94.6% 93.9% 92.3% 91.0% 91.7% 90.7% 89.4% 85.9% 82.0% 80.2%
MDA 2 YB 
Forecast
93.7% 94.0% 92.0% 90.4% 89.8% 91.3% 91.6% 89.7% 85.8% 87.0% 87.9%
MDA 3 YB 
Forecast
98.1% 98.8% 98.4% 98.1% 97.6% 100.0% 96.3% 98.0% 96.2% 97.5% 96.7%
MDA 4 YB 
Forecast
90.7% 90.6% 85.4% 85.8% 84.0% 83.3% 86.7% 84.7% 81.0% 85.4% 85.7%
MDA GLOBAL 
Forecast
90.3% 84.8% 84.0% 82.8% 82.4% 81.7% 77.2% 79.8% 77.6% 78.0% 82.4%
Forecasts for failed 
s/(H. F)
1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb
LOGIT 1 YB 
Forecast
81.8% 87.3% 87.9% 87.5% 85.0% 82.4% 84.5% 86.6% 83.6% 78.1% 70.0%
LOGIT 2 YB 
Forecast
65.8% 58.2% 54.5% 54.3% 45.6% 48.3% 39.3% 42.1% 41.5% 30.2% 31.9%
LOGIT 3 YB 
Forecast
78.6% 70.8% 64.0% 62.3% 57.2% 59.6% 48.9% 52.0% 48.7% 44.7% 50.0%
LOGIT 4 YB 
Forecast
76.8% 81.8% 77.1% 76.6% 75.3% 72.5% 69.8% 70.9% 68.9% 62.0% 65.9%
LOGIT GLOBAL 
Forecast
73.6% 70.6% 66.7% 66.3% 64.3% 66.5% 66.1% 62.6% 62.6% 59.9% 60.4%Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Table 4
MRL prediction (BD2a may 2010)
The capacity for forecasting business failure featured by any of the above models 
is satisfactory, with the result obtained by the MDA adjustment being the most ac-
ceptable. The linear model appears to have a good prediction capacity but we must 
rule it out because of its inability to classify healthy companies in an acceptable 
manner.
The contrast against the 2011 database, BD2b, resulted in:
Table 5 
MDA/LOGIT prediction (BD2b nov 2011)
Forecasts for 
failed s/(H, F)
1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb
MRL 1 YB 
Forecast
85.0% 95.8% 96.6% 98.8% 98.4% 96.7% 99.5% 99.5% 100.0% 98.8% 98.9%
MRL 2 YB 
Forecast
75.5% 89.3% 93.5% 93.5% 94.1% 91.3% 94.4% 94.4% 95.6% 94.4% 96.7%
MRL 3 YB 
Forecast
81.8% 93.4% 96.5% 97.7% 97.2% 97.0% 98.6% 98.5% 97.8% 97.5% 98.9%
MRL 4 YB 
Forecast
71.8% 86.4% 88.0% 88.0% 87.9% 87.1% 90.5% 89.9% 90.4% 89.9% 85.7%
MRL GLOBAL 
Forecast
92.6% 95.9% 97.3% 98.4% 97.7% 97.5% 98.1% 98.5% 98.4% 96.8% 100.0%
Failed in % 1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb
MDA 1YB 98% 97% 94% 90% 92% 91% 92% 89% 89% 84% 84%
MDA 2YB 94% 95% 91% 87% 91% 90% 89% 90% 88% 87% 87%
MDA 3YB 99% 99% 98% 96% 97% 99% 97% 98% 97% 97% 98%
MDA 4YB 95% 95% 90% 91% 91% 91% 91% 90% 89% 89% 89%
MDA 
GLOBAL
97% 97% 95% 93% 94% 96% 95% 93% 96% 92% 98%
LOGIT 1YB 87% 88% 86% 85% 86% 85% 83% 85% 82% 80% 78%
LOGIT 2YB 70% 63% 57% 54% 51% 51% 45% 43% 46% 37% 38%
LOGIT 3YB 84% 74% 66% 63% 64% 63% 55% 57% 53% 49% 54%
LOGIT 4YB 88% 86% 75% 72% 74% 70% 68% 71% 66% 64% 61%
LOGIT 
GLOBAL
65% 48% 51% 51% 53% 51% 52% 51% 47% 48% 50%
Data (average 
in No.)
113 119 297 295 273 256 236 215 195 173 122
Failed 
(average)
88% 84% 80% 78% 79% 79% 77% 77% 75% 73% 74%
Solvent 
(average)
12% 16% 20% 22% 21% 21% 23% 23% 25% 27% 26%DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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Previously to the estimation of models, we have performed a factor analysis aimed 
at reducing the variables to a small number of synthetic and homogenous regres-
sors. We perform the estimation for each of the time horizons, between one and 
four years before the failure event. In all cases we have excluded the factors whose 
eigenvalue was lower than one.
In the four horizons, the four variables with more weight are related to profitability 
and liquidity (which is measured as cash flow), indebtedness and solvency; the 
composition of the factors is similar with the exception of the year 4 before the fai-
lure (4yb). These results confirm the relationship between the ratios of profitability 
and operating cash flow (Gombola and Ketz, 1983; Pina, 1992).
Table 6
LOGIT, MDA, MRL Contrast s/107 healthy companies (2010 BD3a)
The prediction capacity of the MDA and LOGIT adjustments on the healthy com-
panies should be understood from two different perspectives. On one hand, they 
lack quality when it comes to rank healthy companies as non-failed in comparison 
to their better performance when contrasting failed companies. On the other, the 
contrast of the financial statements reveals that healthy companies have, or may 
have in the future, certain imperfections. One of the first conclusions referred to the 
dismissal of MRL (Linear Regression) models on the basis of their poor prediction 
capacity.
Forecasts for 
healthy s/(H, F)
1yb 2yb 3yb 4yb 5yb 6yb 7yb 8yb 9yb 10yb 11yb
MDA 1 YB  39.3% 37.4% 43.9% 43.9% 44.9% 47.7% 45.8% 43.9% 46.7% 53.3% 48.1%
MDA 2 YB  43.9% 36.4% 40.2% 36.4% 41.1% 39.3% 42.1% 38.3% 38.3% 42.9% 43.3%
MDA 3 YB  9.3% 11.2% 8.4% 5.6% 8.4% 9.3% 8.4% 10.3% 7.5% 8.6% 10.6%
MDA 4 YB  42.1% 33.6% 35.5% 24.3% 29.9% 31.8% 35.5% 33.6% 33.6% 28.6% 34.6%
MDA GLOBAL  32.7% 26.2% 28.0% 23.4% 28.0% 27.1% 25.2% 24.3% 24.3% 21.9% 21.2%
LOGIT 1 YB  16.8% 20.6% 18.7% 18.7% 21.5% 27.1% 22.4% 23.4% 27.1% 28.6% 28.8%
LOGIT 2 YB  73.8% 81.3% 87.9% 91.6% 92.5% 88.8% 89.7% 90.7% 89.7% 90.5% 91.3%
LOGIT 3 YB  83.2% 81.3% 83.2% 86.9% 89.7% 89.7% 86.0% 86.0% 82.2% 85.7% 86.5%
LOGIT 4 YB  68.2% 71.0% 80.4% 80.4% 82.2% 83.2% 79.4% 76.6% 72.9% 77.1% 82.7%
LOGIT GLOBAL  75.7% 77.6% 77.6% 77.6% 82.2% 81.3% 77.6% 80.4% 76.6% 74.3% 76.9%
MRL 1 YB  3.7% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MRL 2 YB  14.0% 12.1% 1.9% 3.7% 2.8% 1.9% 1.9% 0.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.9%
MRL 3 YB  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MRL 4 YB  20.6% 20.6% 2.8% 5.6% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 5.6% 3.8% 3.8%
MRL GLOBAL  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Contrast with DEA model
With the aim of unifying criteria, we have taken the ratios shown below on the 
basis of the financial-accounting information available from the 298 failed and 107 
healthy companies:9
Outputs
 It shows the level of indebtedness with respect to the total 
assets. The higher this value is, the more externally dependent the company will 
be and, consequently, will restrict its room for manoeuvre. It explains the risk of 
insolvency (business failure). 
   It shows the need for immediate cover; possibility of 
default on its short-term liabilities. The higher its value is, the lower the liquidity 
will be and the higher the risk of insolvency.
Inputs
 Ratio explaining the asset capacity to generate income (ROA).
   It reveals how efficient the company is concerning the use of 
its own resources to generate liquidity (cash).
   It reveals how efficient the company is concerning the use of 
its own resources to generate profit before interest and tax, i.e. it is the capacity to 
generate profit by the asset irrespectively of how it has been funded.
 It reveals the capacity to profit before interest and tax 
in order to cover debt and operating costs on EBIT.
9Premachandra et al. (2009), citing Altman (1968).DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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 It reveals the added value ratio earned by the sharehold-
ers, although we should use the market value, but SMEs are not usually quoted on 
the stock exchange; hence this substitution in the denominator.
 Warehouse, Debtors, Treasury and other short-term liabili-
ties, i.e. Current Assets. The higher the ratio is the higher the liquidity will be and, 
therefore, the greater the capacity to meet short-term obligations will be too.
 It shows that long-term resources are funding short-
term liabilities. The circulating capital is the difference between current assets and 
liabilities. The higher it is, the better. However, an “excessive” value would be a 
sign of idle resources. In addition, we could find “false negatives” as under certain 
financial structures the average maturity of the suppliers’ credits is higher than the 
average maturity of the debtors’ credits, i.e. a negative circulating capital. But let’s 
take the ratio in a strictly protective sense to cover short-term liabilities, therefore, 
it should always be positive (CC=FM=Ac-Pc>0).
Without entering into the debate about the choice of the above ratios, we have 
made the MDA and LOGIT adjustments on our original samples, in the last five 
years, achieving the following results:Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Table 7
LOGIT, MDA Prediction
While they are still good adjustments, the quality of the adjustment is questiona-
ble, to say the least, given the little significance of some of the ratios used in the 
mentioned articles. 
DEA model
DEA aims to determine the hyperplanes defining a closed surface or Pareto fron-
tier. Those units (companies, DMUs) located on the border will be efficient, as 
all the others will be inefficient. The DEA model10 will include the variable ck, to 
allow variable returns models.
LOGIT MDA
Fail Variables Type
Classified 
correctly
Fail Variables Type
Classified 
correctly
Year 
0
All
H 75.70%
Year 0
All
H 46.70%
F 94.60% F 92.20%
Excluded (O2, I6)
H 76.60% Excluded (I1, I2, 
I5, I6, I7)
H 42.10%
F 94.90% F 91.90%
Year 
-1
All
H 67.30%
Year -1
All
H 78.50%
F 94.60% F 81.00%
Excluded (O2, 
I3, I4)
H 66.40% Excluded (I1, I3, 
I4, I5)
H 77.60%
F 93.90% F 80.30%
Year 
-2
All
H 64.50%
Year -2
All
H 85.00%
F 92.40% F 57.00%
Excluded (I4)
H 64.50% Excluded (I2, 
I3, I4)
H 84.10%
F 92.40% F 81.10%
Year 
-3
All
H 50.50%
Year -3
All
H 80.40%
F 90.50% F 79.40%
Excluded (I1, I2, 
I3, I4, I5)
H 51.40% Excluded (I1, I2, 
I3, I4, I5)
H 83.20%
F 91.20% F 79.40%
Year 
-4
All
H 69.20%
Year -4
All
H 65.40%
F 93.90% F 89.30%
Excluded (O2, 
I3, I4)
H 70.10% Excluded (O2, I1, 
I3, I4, I5, I6)
H 65.40%
F 94.70% F 90.40%
10Adler et al. (2002).DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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Equation 1: DEA for efficient frontier
 
Based on the linear programming system, we have determined the set of hyper-
planes defining the efficient and inefficient frontiers. We must put forward one 
criticism, as the determination of the efficient frontier offers scope for arbitrari-
ness. It is based on the average value of the ratios, the best adjustment, and the 
best regression. In our case, we took the average values of the ratios for each year 
(Healthy and Failed). Therefore, this is a “relative” frontier, not absolute. Thus, 
we have determined both efficient and inefficient frontiers for each of the last four 
years. On the basis of the above approach, we have determined both the efficient 
and inefficient units depending on the particular case. In the case of two variables, 
the frontiers could be displayed as follows below:
Figure 1
Efficient and inefficient frontiersPablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Since we have been able to determine the set of DMUs defining the efficiency fron-
tiers, the likelihood of financial failure or non-failure, we can add a complementary 
approach in order to determine whether any DMU analysed is or not efficient. 
Equation 2: additive DEA
 
 
 
The above determined frontiers11 provide the parameters for a hyperplane or ma-
trix of inputs (X) and outputs (Y), which will be formed by the values of the varia-
bles (ratios) that make up the set of efficient companies and that is located on this 
hypothetically efficient line (hyperplane)12
•  X will be a matrix of kxn inputs and Y, a matrix of mxn outputs, with n being 
the number of DMUs making up the frontier, including their respective k 
inputs, m outputs, 
•  e is an unit vector, 
•  x0 , y0 : column vectors showing the inputs and outputs of the DMU subject 
to classification,
•  s-  s+ : vectors showing the slacks of the matrix of inputs and outputs in the 
DMU analysed, indicating the relative efficiency; the lower the objective 
function is the better the position of DMU will be with respect to the 
frontier (efficient/inefficient), 
•	 l will be the vector determining the intensity of development in the analysed 
unit with respect to the efficient (or inefficient, where appropriate) frontier.
Since we have been able to determine the efficient/inefficient hyperplane, the next 
step will be to determine whether an analysed unit is or not on the frontier. This 
will allow us to determine the stress levels in a particular unit with respect to the 
11Equation 1.
12Similarly, we will be able to apply the same approach, only inversely, to the case of inefficient companies.DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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hypothetically efficient/inefficient ones. This is a more complex and tedious task 
as we will have to develop each and every analysed unit in order to place it in re-
lation to the efficient or inefficient frontier. 
This is the second step, the development of the approach shown in equation 2. 
Based on a given efficient/inefficient frontier formed by the matrixes Xl, Yl, we 
will analyse a particular company (DMU0) represented by its inputs and outputs 
(x0,y0)’. The result will tell us the state of the company with respect to the efficient 
and inefficient frontiers, respectively.
In our case, based on the three databases discussed above, four efficient frontiers 
(EF) and other four inefficient (nonEF) ones were created in relation to the four 
years analysed. The database containing 2 966 (Healthy and Failed) companies 
was randomly sampled, with 402 (failed and non-failed) companies evaluated with 
respect to the efficient and inefficient frontiers, achieving the following results:
Table 8
DEA-based classification
We can state that capacity to classify the analysed companies (DMUs) is signi-
ficantly high. The column “Classified correctly” shows that they are not on the 
Pareto, or efficient, frontier but not too far from it, therefore, we do not know how 
inefficient they are. We  cannot forget to mention that the maximum we established 
as a measure of comparison is itself “relative,” not an “absolute” measure, althou-
gh we can define it as a “relative maximum.” The “no feasible solution” indicator 
shows the amount of input-output vectors to be compared with respect to the effi-
cient frontier, which does not have a feasible solution, i.e. it provides a solution but 
fails with model restrictions. 
Classified 
correctly
Erroneously 
classified
No feasible 
solution 
On efficient 
frontier
Healthy 80.54% 6.01% 13.45%
Failed 76.39% 6.29% 17.32%
On inefficient 
frontier
Healthy 79.80% 4.67% 15.53%
Failed 82.67% 4.83% 12.50%Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Figure 2
Classification in relation to efficient/inefficient frontiers
Conclusions
With this study we have sought to provide evidence showing that the statistical 
models currently used to infer situations of financial distress and to forecast a pos-
sible financial failure might have overestimated the failure probability. Our earlier 
studies showed evidence supporting the ability of the MDA and LOGIT models 
to efficiently detect failed and insolvent companies. These models have now been 
applied to a contrasting random sampling exclusively made up of healthy compa-
nies in order to verify the possible existence of systematic biased opinions in the 
forecast. Likewise, the present study provides reasonable evidence about the reli-
ability of the DEA model to forecast business failure. Not exempt from criticism 
or, if preferred, easy –immediate– applicability to the day-to-day practice of risk 
estimation. 
In sight of the results shown above, we can confirm that DEA provides further ev-
idence about whether a company is failing, thus, performing at a satisfactory level 
despite its arduous modelling. On a general basis, results show that a significant 
ratio of the companies that we assume are failed can correctly be “classified” as 
failed by the MDA, LOGIT and DEA models. But although DEA “works,” it still 
has significant inconveniences along with evident benefits. 
Among the “benefits,” we can highlight:
•  DEA can be modelled for multiple inputs and outputs
•  DEA does not require functional links between inputs and outputsDEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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•  In DEA the Decision-Making Units (DMUs) can be compared against a 
peer or combination of peers
•  In DEA, inputs and outputs can have a different measurement, for example, 
investment on R&D against efficiency and effectiveness of the production 
system in terms of redundant processes found and removed
•  Regarding the “inconveniences,” we should bear in mind that:
•  DEA cannot eliminate the extremely technical noise, even the symmetrical 
noise with zero mean that causes significant estimation errors 
•  DEA is good at estimating the relative efficiency of a Decision-Making 
Unit (DMU) but it converges very slowly to absolute efficiency. In other 
words, it can tell you how well you are doing compared to your peers but 
not compared to a theoretical maximum. 
•  Since DEA is a nonparametric technique, statistical hypotheses are difficult 
and also the main focus of a lot of research 
•  There is a significant computing problem as a standard formulation of DEA 
creates a separate linear program for each DMU
We must remember that, essentially, DEA is based on a comparison exercise be-
tween peers that has been extrapolated to a “hierarchical” issue applied to financial 
environments with business failure risk: “healthy” / “failed.”
Perhaps the most complex issue regarding its applicability roots  is the fact that 
the set of articles we have been discussing are not truly academic or exclusively 
academic. In a few cases they are even detached from a significant practical reality. 
Occasionally, its mathematical and cryptic levels make it difficult to implement 
in everyday life of financial management, who are aiming to determine the risk 
exposure. 
In addition to the great advantages of the ratios (we can visualise immediately the 
correct or incorrect position of our company structure; compare our company to 
the relevant industry, the position of other companies at the same time as our com-
pany’s life cycle) there are also limitations that need to be borne in mind:
•  Dispersion of the data used to obtain the reference values. The publication of 
reference average values is usually obtained from the average values of the 
sectorial information, which normally lacks additional information about the 
degree of dispersion of the sample data. This makes it impossible to compare 
our sample with the reference values.Pablo de Llano Monelos, Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez y Manuel Rodríguez López
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•  The existing correlation between the variables forming a ratio. Something that 
is not implicit in the ratio concept but that subsists as an element that distorts 
its values and their development (i.e. its usefulness) is the potential correlation 
between the variables related by a ratio. This problem is aggravated with clo-
sely related ratios, invalidating its reading temporarily either for being depen-
dant or for a high degree of correlation. In the present case:
•  Clearly-related TDTA and CLTA inputs; Total Debt, Current Debt, 
both types of debt with respect to the Total Assets (net assets) 
•  NITA, CFTA, EBTA, EBFE outputs containing elements related; 
Net income, Cash Flow, EBIT. Sometimes dependent, as in EBTA, 
where the numerator BAIT and the denominator Financial Expenses 
are part of the EBIT.
•  The reference Values or standards: we have to take into account that ratios are 
control tools (objective against result), while any reference value should be 
established depending on the company, the sector of activity and the moment 
in the company’s life cycle. The evolution of the ratio and the corrective 
measures against deviations should take priority in the analysis. 
Furthermore, we have corroborated the existence of systematic biased opinions 
supporting the situations of insolvency: models perform more efficiently when 
their aim is to identify potentially failed companies and they commit more er-
rors on average when they are used to evaluate solvent companies. This tendency 
seems to be more pronounced in the discriminant models, perhaps because they 
impose a discretional treatment to a particular reality –the state of insolvency– that 
is diffuse and liable to qualifications. In our opinion, logit models are more reliable 
to grasp the different realities that coexist in the generic concept of solvency. That 
is why they also perform relatively well between financially healthy companies.
It seems reasonable to conclude that DEA (based on LOGIT), MDA and LOGIT 
models should not be interpreted as mutually exclusive alternatives, but as com-
plementary methods that, implemented in conjunction, can help fill their respective 
gaps.
Finally, it seems necessary to enrich the factors used as forecast variables. The 
ratios proved to be an excellent tool, nevertheless, the relevance of the models can DEA as a business failure prediction tool. Application to the case of galician SMEs
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improve with the help of complementary information that may corroborate –and 
what it seems more important to us, qualify– the forecast. In this sense, the infor-
mation provided by the audit report13 seems to have a special informational content 
through indirect indicators such as the auditor turnover rate, the average duration 
of their contracts and the proportion of qualified reports.
We must look back at the concept of “management responsibility” in the failure 
process. A recent study14 states that “two out of three Spanish senior executives 
do not match up to the requirements of their responsibilities,” and also notes that 
“only 22% of middle managers think that senior executives are qualified to make 
sensible decisions.” When the economic situation is buoyant, it is reasonable to 
believe that errors, the lack of leadership, the delay in the taking of decisions are 
easily covered by the surplus generated by the system. But what happens when the 
system shrinks? The good times have hidden the low profiles of the directors. The 
recession or contraction periods reveal inability to make decisions. This is not a 
new idea but the verification of the “Peter Principle,” i.e. the verification of how 
important the human capital is in this process. The concept of a company as a sys-
tem allows us to adopt an analytical approach to identify problems, i.e. the way all 
the company decisions are related to each other. Formally considered, a company 
is defined in Business Economics as an organisation: a complex, target-driven, 
socio-technical system that also has an authority structure, a system to allocate 
responsibilities and a control mechanism. In the last few years we have seen many 
examples of an irresponsible lack of control by companies and public authorities 
that has resulted in the recent crises. There is no need to legislate more, just exer-
cise more control; by comparing objective to result, determining the variances 
that have occurred, implementing corrective actions. Simple models are the most 
efficient: principle of parsimony.
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